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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE: THE 
“EXPENSE” OF A DE NOVO REVIEW  
OF USPTO DECISIONS 
Abstract: Courts have traditionally deferred to the American Rule presumption 
against awarding attorney’s fees. On February 4, 2019, however, in Booking.com 
v. USPTO, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
term “expenses” in 35 U.S.C. § 1071 allows the USPTO to recover attorney’s 
fees when an applicant challenges the denial of its trademark. In contrast, on July 
17, 2018, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, held that the USPTO was not entitled to recover attor-
ney’s fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145—the patent analog to 15 U.S.C. § 1071. 
Both statutes require an applicant to pay “all of the expenses of the proceeding,” 
even if the applicant proves that the USPTO wrongly rejected their trademark or 
patent. On March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in NantKwest to 
resolve the issue. This Comment argues that the statutory interpretation em-
ployed by the Federal Circuit in NantKwest is more faithful to Supreme Court 
precedent and canons of statutory construction than the interpretation employed 
by the Fourth Circuit in Booking.com. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should 
reaffirm the decision in NantKwest and disallow an award of attorney’s fees un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 145 and 15 U.S.C. § 1071. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) may deny 
patent applications and trademark registrations to applicants who do not meet 
the necessary requirements.1 Applicants who seek to challenge the denial of 
their trademark registration or patent application may appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or initiate a de novo appeal in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 35 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). A granted patent is an award of intellectual property, with the right to 
exclude others from making or using an invention for, typically, twenty years. Id. § 154; General 
Information Concerning Patents, USPTO (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-2 [https://perma.cc/Y5AQ-WDCT] [herein-
after General Patent Information]. When an applicant applies for a patent, the USPTO investigates 
and examines the applicant’s claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 131. For something to be patentable, it 
must have patentable subject matter, be novel, non-obvious, and useful. Id. §§ 101–103. Similarly, the 
USPTO evaluates trademark registrability. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). A trademark is a word or symbol 
that is used to allow the general public to associate the mark with certain goods and services. General 
Patent Information, supra. Trademark registration is also an award of intellectual property, with the 
right to exclude others from using a similar mark that might confuse the public. Id. To register a 
trademark, the mark must be distinct and used in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)–(f). 
II.-198 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.2 If an ap-
peal is filed in the Federal Circuit, the proceeding operates on a closed record 
from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “PTAB”) or the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (the “TTAB”).3 Alternatively, if an appeal is filed in the dis-
trict court, new evidence and testimony may be introduced at trial.4 Applicants 
who choose to file a de novo appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 or 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1071, however, must bear “all the expenses of the proceeding” regardless of 
whether the applicant prevails.5 
Prior to 2013, the USPTO had not petitioned the district court to recover 
attorney’s fees, but rather, successfully sought minimal “expenses,” such as 
travel costs and expert fees.6 Beginning in 2013, however, the USPTO argued 
that attorney’s fees were included in their “expenses.”7 Some believe that this 
policy change was the result of the USPTO’s rising costs and was designed to 
                                                                                                                           
 2 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 145. Some have suggested that Congress created the Feder-
al Circuit in order to resolve patent disputes and standardize patent law. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking 
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1453–54 (2012). Patents and trademarks are regis-
tered at the USPTO headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. USPTO Locations, USPTO, https://www.
uspto.gov/about-us/uspto-office-locations (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/C6XJ-USYQ]. 
The Eastern District of Virginia hears cases from Alexandria due to its geographic location. Eastern 
District of Virginia Jurisdiction, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF VA., http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/
jury/jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7VRJ-6JNG]. Because the Federal 
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases and the Eastern District of Virginia has jurisdiction 
in Alexandria, Virginia, both courts may hear appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) or Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4); 35 U.S.C. § 145; 
Gugliuzza, supra, at 1453–54; USPTO Locations, supra; Eastern District of Virginia Jurisdiction, 
supra. When an applicant chooses to forgo an appeal to the Federal Circuit, the district court makes 
determinations about the case de novo because it is the first court to hear the new evidence. Kappos v. 
Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 444 (2012). Thus, the district court acts as a factfinder by evaluating and weigh-
ing the new evidence in light of the existing administrative record. Id. 
 3 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. §§ 141–143. The Federal Circuit reviews the USPTO’s fac-
tual findings pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), which sets forth standards 
governing judicial review of findings of fact made by federal administrative agencies. See Dickinson 
v. Zurko, 528 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding that the APA applies to the Federal Circuit when review-
ing the USPTO’s findings of fact). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); Kappos, 566 U.S. at 444 (holding that the applicant may introduce 
evidence that the USPTO had not previously considered to prove that his or her claimed invention is 
patentable). 
 5 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3); 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
 6 See, e.g., Cook v. Watson, 208 F.2d 529, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (allowing the USPTO to recoup 
printing expenses); Robertson v. Cooper, 46 F.2d 766, 769 (4th Cir. 1931) (allowing the USPTO to 
recoup reasonable travel expenses); Taylor v. Matal, No. 1:15-cv-1607, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
184303, at *14 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2017) (allowing the USPTO to recoup reasonable costs for expert 
fees). To recover expenses associated with attorney’s fees, the USPTO must file a Motion for Expens-
es. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2). 
 7 Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 230 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the UPSTO did not dis-
pute the contention that it had never sought an attorney’s fee award under § 1071 or § 145 prior to 
2013). 
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recoup some of the agency’s overall expenditures.8 Others believe the change 
was implemented in order to limit the USPTO’s caseload by discouraging ap-
plicants to appeal to the district court.9 Still, others believe the decision to seek 
attorney’s fees was in reaction to the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Kap-
pos v. Hyatt.10 There, the Court ruled against the USPTO when the agency 
sought to limit a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new types of evidence 
at the § 145 district court proceeding.11 The USPTO argued that the appeal 
should have proceeded on a closed record, which is typical when there is judi-
                                                                                                                           
 8 SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSEL LLP, Fourth Circuit Holds That Policy Requiring Payment of 
USPTO Attorneys’ Fees Stands, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (May 9, 2017), https://www.worldtrade
markreview.com/enforcement-and-litigation/fourth-circuit-holds-policy-requiring-payment-uspto-
attorneys-fees [https://perma.cc/QN5V-E5HW]. The USPTO expected a $207 million revenue in-
crease, but only received approximately $80 million in revenue. USPTO, Patent Public Advisory 
Committee Annual Report 2013, 1396 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 197, Topical Area I.A (Nov. 
26, 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2013/week48/TOC.htm#PPACAnnual
Report2013 [https://perma.cc/2FC4-SNPA] [hereinafter USPTO Annual Report 2013]. The USPTO 
attributed their increased costs in 2013 to several provisions of the America Invents Act (“AIA”). See 
id. (noting that patent system underwent major revisions in March 2013, when the United States 
changed from a first-to-invent system to a first-inventor-to-file system and issued a new user fee struc-
ture). The pre-AIA first-to-invent system awarded patent rights to inventor A, who proved that he 
created the invention prior inventor B filing a patent application. John Villasenor, The United States 
Transitions to a ‘First-Inventor-to-File’ Patent System, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:54PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/03/11/march-16-2013-america-transitions-to-a-first-
inventor-to-file-patent-system/#52e0c59e3324 [https://perma.cc/L5MJ-VWN7]. After the AIA, how-
ever, the first-inventor-to-file system awarded patent rights to inventor B if inventor A did not take 
prompt action to protect his invention. Id. Overall, the AIA was an expansive patent reform that also 
created inter partes review, a review process for evaluating patents that had already been issued. 
Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015). Ultimately, the AIA dis-
rupted the typical filing behavior of patent applicants, and resulted in a rise of unanticipated costs to 
the USPTO. USPTO Annual Report 2013, supra, at Topical Area I.A; see also Matthew Bultman, 
USPTO Hikes Patent Fees, Price of AIA Reviews, LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2017, 4:36PM), https://www.
law360.com/articles/985084/uspto-hikes-patent-fees-price-of-aia-reviews [https://perma.cc/C634-
CVT4] (discussing the USPTO’s fee-increase for applicants challenging patents, the first major re-
structuring of patent fees since the AIA, in order to help cover the agency’s expenses). Additionally, 
some have posited that the change in policy to start petitioning the court for attorney’s fees may have 
been the result of the USPTO’s changing goals. See Bill Donahue, With Sharp Split, USPTO Fee Rule 
Could Head to High Court, LAW360 (July 30, 2018, 8:42PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1068403/with-sharp-split-uspto-fee-rule-could-head-to-high-court [https://perma.cc/TV3H-JTRP] 
(discussing how Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 
the USPTO, may not be as concerned with recouping attorney’s fees as the previous administration, 
because he has already enacted changes designed to help patent owners). 
 9 A.B.A., REPORT: 108A, at 4 (2016) [hereinafter Report 108A]. The American Bar Association 
noted that applicants incur high costs merely by filing at the district court. Id. For example, applicants 
must pay costs associated with discovery, the introduction of new evidence, and expert and attorney’s 
fees. Id. Accordingly, the additional cost to compensate the USPTO with attorney’s fees would dis-
courage applicants from filing in the district court to begin with. Id. 
 10 Id. at 5. 
 11 Kappos, 566 U.S. at 438. The Supreme Court held that § 145 does not impose any restrictions 
on the admission of new evidence. Id. at 445–46. 
II.-200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
cial review of agency decisions.12 The Court held that because a § 145 pro-
ceeding allows the district court to act as a factfinder, the court is not perform-
ing a traditional judicial review.13 After the decision, around the same time that 
the USPTO began requesting attorney’s fees, the USPTO sought to completely 
dispose of de novo district court proceedings.14 
The issue of whether to award the USPTO attorney’s fees under the Pa-
tent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 145, and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1071, is unique in 
that the Federal Circuit and the Fourth Circuit are the only circuit courts that 
have the authority to rule on this issue.15 Moreover, the essentially identical 
phrasing in § 145 and § 1071 has motivated courts to provide a single interpre-
tation of the statutes.16 In 2018, in NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Id. at 438; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (limiting judicial review of agency decisions to the 
administrative record). 
 13 Kappos, 566 U.S. at 438. 
 14 A.B.A, PROPOSED RESOLUTION 299-2, at 1–12 (2014); Courtney C. Brinkerhoff, Congressman 
Goodlatte Proposes Patent Reform to Eliminate Section 145 Actions and Exelixis I-Type Patent Term 
Adjustment, PHARMAPATENTSBLOG.COM (Jun. 3, 2013), https://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2013/
06/03/congressman-goodlatte-proposes-patent-reform-to-eliminate-section-145-actions-and-exelixis-i-
type-patent-term-adjustment/ [https://perma.cc/W5J7-GK4G]. Moreover, the USPTO has taken the 
position that de novo district court reviews of PTAB and TTAB decisions invades its gatekeeping role 
to determine trademark registrability and patentability. Report 108A, supra note 9, at 5. 
 15 See About the Court, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/about-the-court [https://perma.cc/Q8QH-W9KW] [hereinafter About the Fourth Circuit] 
(noting that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia is one of the various 
courts that the Fourth Circuit hears appeals from); Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/Y7L2-
VVGP] [hereinafter Fed. Circuit Jurisdiction] (discussing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over all of 
the United States District Courts). Because § 145 and § 1071 require a de novo district court proceed-
ing to occur in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, only the Fourth 
Circuit and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals may hear the resulting appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 1071; 35 
U.S.C. § 145;About the Fourth Circuit, supra; Fed. Circuit Jurisdiction, supra. In general, a circuit 
split involving the Federal Circuit is rare because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over 
federal claims, patents, and veterans’ appeals. Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 272 (2013). Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court seldom hears appeals from the Federal Circuit as a result of circuit splits. Id. In fact, as of 2013, 
there have only been eight cases where the Supreme Court has granted certiorari due to a circuit split 
involving the Federal Circuit. Id. at 272 n.2. Of those eight cases, only one case involved a circuit split 
between the Fourth Circuit and the Federal Circuit. Id.; see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 
826 (1984) (resolving a personal jurisdiction issue involving a military officer). 
 16 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (“[A]ll the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the 
party bringing the case, whether the final decision is in favor of such party or not.”), with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 145 (“[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant”). See, e.g., NantKwest, 
Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1635 (U.S. Mar. 
4, 2019) (No. 18A-369) (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in its 2014 opinion in Sham-
mas v. Focarino, a trademark case interpreting § 1071, in a patent case regarding § 145); Booking.com 
B.V. v. Matal (Booking.com I), No. 1:16-cv-425, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 
2017), at *16 (applying the Federal Circuit’s reasoning from its 2017 opinion in NantKwest, Inc. v. Lee 
(Lee II), 686 F. App’x 864, 865–67 (Fed. Cir. 2017), a § 145 patent case, to a § 1071 trademark case). 
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held that § 145 did not permit the USPTO to recover attorney’s fees.17 In 2017, 
in a similar case, Booking.com v. Matal (Booking.com I), the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia relied on Fourth Circuit precedent and held that 
§ 1071 did allow the USPTO to recoup attorney’s fees.18 On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit, in 2019, in Booking.com v. USPTO (Booking.com II), upheld the Book-
ing.com I court’s decision.19 
The split over whether “all the expenses of the proceeding” includes at-
torney’s fees raises questions of statutory interpretation and the breadth of the 
“American Rule”—the notion that parties pay for their own attorney’s fees 
absent statutory authority to the contrary.20 Recently, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari to resolve the issue.21 Part I of this Comment gives an overview of 
the American Rule, the factual and procedural background of NantKwest, Inc. 
v. Iancu, and the factual and procedural background of Booking.com v. 
USPTO.22 Part II of this Comment discusses the legal significance of the word 
“expense” in the Lanham Act and Patent Act in relation to the American 
Rule.23 Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that the statutory interpretation 
employed by the Federal Circuit in NantKwest is more faithful to Supreme 
Court precedent than Booking.com and thus the United States Supreme Court 
is likely to rule against the USPTO.24 
I. CHALLENGING THE DENIAL OF A TRADEMARK OR PATENT 
The Patent Act and Lanham Trademark Act govern patents and trade-
marks, respectively,25 and offer remedies for applicants who are dissatisfied 
with the decision of the PTAB or the TTAB.26 Both Acts authorize parties to 
                                                                                                                           
 17 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1196. 
 18 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *18. 
 19 Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO (Booking.com II), Nos. 17-2458, 17-2459, 2019 U.S. App. LEX-
IS 3456 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019), at *29. 
 20 See infra notes 25–127 and accompanying text. 
 21 NantKwest, 898 F.3d 1177, cert. granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1635 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2019) (No. 
18A-369). 
 22 See infra notes 25–70 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 71–109 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text. 
 25 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (governing trademark law); U.S. Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (governing patent law and establishing the USPTO). 
 26 15 U.S.C. § 1071; 35 U.S.C. § 145. If an examiner rejects an applicant’s patent application 
twice, the applicant may appeal the examiner’s decision to the PTAB. 35 U.S.C § 134. The PTAB 
consists of a three-member panel of judges who have “scientific ability.” 35 U.S.C § 6. Scientific 
ability usually includes a bachelor’s or higher degree in an engineering or scientific discipline. Melis-
sa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1959, 1974 n.66 (2013). Similarly, if an examiner rejects an applicant’s trademark 
registration, an appeal may be taken to the TTAB. 15 U.S.C. § 1070. Both the PTAB and TTAB are 
independent tribunals within the USPTO that decide disputes regarding patentability and trademark 
registration, respectively. About PTAB, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
II.-202 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
challenge a PTAB or TTAB ruling by filing an appeal in the Federal Circuit or 
filing a de novo civil action against the Director of the USPTO (“the Director”) 
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.27 If an applicant opts 
to file a new civil action, the applicant must pay “all the expenses of the pro-
ceeding,” under § 1071 or § 145, regardless of whether the applicant prevails.28 
Applying the American Rule presumption against awarding attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party, the Federal Circuit in NantKwest held that § 145 did not 
permit the USPTO to recover attorney’s fees.29 In Booking.com II, a similar 
case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia’s decision in holding that the American Rule did not apply to § 1071 
and allowed the USPTO to recoup attorney’s fees.30 
This Part provides background on the American Rule and current split be-
tween the Fourth and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.31 Section A of this 
Part discusses the American Rule and its policies.32 Section B of this Part ex-
amines the facts and procedural history of NantKwest.33 Section C of this Part 
summarizes the facts and procedural history of Booking.com.34 
A. The American Rule Presumption Against Awarding Attorney’s Fees 
Regarded as a “bedrock principle” by the Supreme Court, the American 
Rule is the standard that litigants are accountable for their own attorney’s fees, 
regardless of the outcome.35 Some courts have imposed a “success” require-
                                                                                                                           
patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab (Feb. 22, 2019); About the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board 
(Feb. 21, 2019). Congress created the PTAB to reduce the cost of patent litigation by providing a 
cheaper alternative to a full-fledged trial on patent validity. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 § 7 (2011); Rebecca Gentilli, Note, Free Bite at the Apple: How Flawed 
Statutory Drafting Has Undermined the Purpose of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 67 DUKE L.J. 
1579, 1579 (2018); see also USPTO, MPEP (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008), Ch. 1200 APPEAL (describ-
ing the PTAB appeal procedure). 
 27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4) (designating the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
as the forum for civil action); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2012) (affording the Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over PTAB and TTAB appeals); 35 U.S.C. § 145 (authorizing an applicant to file an ac-
tion in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in lieu of an appeal to the Federal Circuit). 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3); 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
 29 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1196. 
 30 Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *29; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
178271, at *18. 
 31 See infra notes 35–70 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 44–57 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 58–70 and accompanying text. 
 35 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. 
v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–47 (1975). The American Rule is the opposite of the English 
Rule, where prevailing litigants may recover attorney’s fees from the losing party. Ruckelshaus v. 
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983); see John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allo-
2019] Heads I Win, Tails You Lose II.-203 
ment in their interpretation of the American Rule, defining the standard as one 
where the prevailing party cannot recover attorney’s fees from the losing par-
ty.36 Since its adoption, the American Rule has been presumed in courts, over-
come only when there is express language in a statute that permits fee-
shifting.37 Thus, the American Rule always acts as a starting point when re-
solving the question of whether to award attorney’s fees.38 
Historically, the American Rule has protected parties who initiate suits 
from having to pay the their adversaries’ fees.39 This is grounded in the policy 
of ensuring equal access to the legal system, because awarding attorney’s fees 
to the prevailing party might discourage individuals from bringing actions.40 In 
other words, plaintiffs may be less willing to file lawsuits at the risk that they 
might be burdened with the defendant’s attorney’s fees.41 Thus, one purpose of 
the American Rule is to ensure everyone can access courts by not imposing 
extraneous costs on plaintiffs seeking relief.42 Congress, however, can create 
“specific and explicit” statutory exceptions to the American Rule.43 
                                                                                                                           
cation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–90 (1993) (discussing 
the American Rule, its policies, and contrasting it to the English Rule). 
 36 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 602 (2001) (“the prevailing party is not entitled to collect [attorney’s fees] from the loser”); 
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 253 (“attorney’s fees recoverable by the prevailing party from the loser”); cf. 
Hardt, 560 U.S. at 252–53 (applying the American Rule despite the fact that the statute made no ref-
erence to a “prevailing party”). In 2010, in Hardt, the Supreme Court found that because the statute in 
question gave the court the discretion to award attorney’s fees when “appropriate,” Congress intended 
to allow parties that had some success, to obtain fees. 560 U.S. at 252–53. 
 37 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1182; see Hardt, 560 U.S. at 252–53 (describing the American Rule as 
the “basic point of reference” when determining whether to allow an award of attorney’s fees); Sum-
mit Valley Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 456 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1982) (beginning 
with an analysis of the American Rule and concluding that an award of “damages” is not specific 
enough to encompass attorney’s fees). In 1982, in Summit Valley v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
& Joiners, the Supreme Court also noted that the American Rule serves to avoid an “endless stream of 
litigation that might ensue if successful litigants could recover their attorney's fees in subsequent ac-
tions.” 456 U.S. at 726. 
 38 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1181. 
 39 Id. Though the phrase itself was not coined until much later, the American Rule has been 
around since the late 1700s. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (disallowing 
an award of attorney’s fees due to general disapproval). 
 40 Hardt, 560 U.S. at 253; NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1881. 
 41 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1881. 
 42 Id. Proponents of the American Rule have argued that it also serves to protect our legal system 
because fees may become inflated if they could be shifted between parties. Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of 
the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2014) (discussing the fee-shifting 
debate). Moreover, hearings to determine an award of attorney’s fees may unnecessarily clog the 
courts and result in an inefficient legal process. Id. Additional supporters of the American Rule have 
also posited that lawyers may not advocate to the best of their ability when faced with arguing in front 
of a judge who will ultimately decide how much to compensate the attorney. Id. Opponents of the 
American Rule, however, have outlined several reasons in support of fee-shifting, or awarding attor-
ney’s fees to the prevailing defendant. Id. For example, when fees are shifted to a winning defendant, 
it seems justified to allow the defendant to recoup his or her attorney’s fees, thereby becoming 
II.-204 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
B. Facts and Procedural History of NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu 
In 2010, a USPTO examiner rejected NantKwest’s patent application, 
which provided a method for treating cancer using natural killer (“NK”) 
cells.44 The examiner rejected the application as being obvious, in violation of 
35 U.S.C. § 103.45 In 2013, the PTAB affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the 
application.46 NantKwest challenged the decision by filing a civil complaint 
against the Director under § 145 in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia.47 The USPTO ultimately prevailed on its motion for summary judg-
ment.48 On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.49 
                                                                                                                           
“whole,” because the defendant was required to engage in the lawsuit. Id. Accordingly, supporters of 
fee-shifting have argued that awarding attorney’s fees to a winning defendant would discourage plain-
tiffs from bringing frivolous lawsuits or pursuing weak claims. Id. at 1486, 1488. 
 43 See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 726 (disallowing an award of attorney’s fees because it cannot 
be clearly construed from the language of the statute); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 (noting that Congress 
can make “specific and explicit” statutes in order to carve out exceptions to the American Rule); see 
also Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (providing that the Equal 
Access to Justice Act, which mentions “fees,” a “prevailing party,” and a “civil action,” is a good 
example of the explicitness required in a statute that would justify a departure from the American 
Rule). But see Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680, 682–83 (finding that the Clean Air Act, which allowed a 
court to “award costs of litigation []including reasonable attorney and expert fees[] whenever it deter-
mines that such award is appropriate[,]” was not explicit enough to warrant a departure from the 
American Rule). 
 44 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183; see Lee II, 686 F. App’x at 865–67 (detailing the science behind 
NantKwest’s patent application). In short, the immune system contains both an innate response, re-
sponsible for the automatic detection and initial attack of an “invader,” and an adaptive response, a 
second line of defense that multiplies cells to continue to attack the “invader.” NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 
1183; What Is Innate Immunity?, CTR. FOR INNATE IMMUNITY & IMMUNE DISEASE, https://ciiid.
washington.edu/content/what-innate-immunity. The innate response consists of NK cells, whereas the 
adaptive response consists of T cells. Lee II, 686 Fed. App’x at 865. Both NK and T cells have been 
proven to destroy cancer cells in vitro, ex vivo, and in vivo. Id. at 866; see also U.S. Patent Application 
No. 10/008,955, Unpublished (filing date Dec. 7, 2001) (Hans Klingemann, applicant) [hereinafter 
’955 Patent Application] (involving NK-92, a cell line of NK cells, to treat cancer). 
 45 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. To be patentable, the subject-matter must be non-obvious. 35 
U.S.C. § 103. According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”)—a guideline for 
patent examiners to understand the law—the test for obviousness is whether the claimed invention 
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, with regard to the prior art. 
USPTO, MPEP (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008), § 2141 EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING 
OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103 [R-08.2017]. Prior art is anything publically available before the 
patent’s priority date, such as a published patent or printed publication. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 46 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. 
 47 Id. The USPTO’s basis for summary judgment was that NantKwest’s claims would have been 
obvious under § 103. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 48 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. NantKwest offered to show results from NK-92’s clinical trials 
to display “unexpected results” in order defeat the USPTO’s obviousness claim of NK-92. Lee II, 686 
Fed. App’x at 873. Additionally, NantKwest put on evidence of a recent $48 million investment to 
display their commercial success. Id. 
 49 Lee II, 686 Fed. App’x at 866, 873. The court held that three claims in the ’955 Patent Applica-
tion were invalid because they were obvious in light of two prior art references. Id. The first prior art 
reference was U.S. Patent No. 5,272,082 (’082 Patent), which provided a method of using T cells in 
vivo to destroy cancer cells. Id. The second prior art reference was a study published by the applicants 
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After the trial, the USPTO filed a motion to recover the expenses of the 
proceedings, which included $78,592.50 in attorney’s fees.50 Citing the Ameri-
can Rule, the district court refused to award the USPTO attorney’s fees.51 The 
district court explained that there needed to be clear statutory authority for it to 
rule in the USPTO’s favor.52 The USPTO appealed and a divided panel of the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.53 The court interpreted 
“[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” provision of § 145 to include attorney’s 
fees.54 Following that decision, the Federal Circuit voted to hear the case en 
banc sua sponte and ultimately vacated the panel’s judgment.55 The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court that the American Rule applies to § 145 
and that there was no explicit congressional authorization to award attorney’s 
fees.56 Currently, a writ of certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court.57 
C. Facts and Procedural History of Booking.com v. USPTO 
Between 2011 and 2012, Booking.com (“Booking”) made three federal 
trademark filings and one Madrid Protocol filing for its BOOKING.COM 
mark.58 The USPTO examiner rejected all four applications on the grounds that 
                                                                                                                           
(“the study”) disclosing that NK-92 cells can lyse, or destroy, cancer cells in vitro. Id. The court 
agreed with the examiner that through a combination of these references it would have been obvious 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to use NK-92 cells to treat cancer in vivo, as claimed by the 
’955 Patent Application. Id. 
 50 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. The motion was filed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2). Id. 
For the procedure involved in recovering expenses, see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 51 NantKwest, Inc. v. Lee (Lee I), 162 F. Supp. 3d 540, 542–43 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d sub nom. 
NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal (Matal I), 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and aff’d en banc sub nom. 
NantKwest, 898 F.3d 1177; see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (providing that in general, the winning liti-
gant is not able to recover attorney’s fees from the loser). 
 52 Lee I, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 543; see Alyeksa, 421 U.S. at 269 (discussing how Congress may 
create a statutory exception to the American Rule). In general, Congress has used unambiguous lan-
guage when permitting an award of attorney’s fees. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260. For example, Congress 
allowed an award of “attorney’s fees” in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227, the 
Truth in Lending Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 261 n.34; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) 
(allowing an award of attorney’s fees); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (providing that plaintiffs may re-
coup reasonable attorney’s fees); 46 U.S.C. § 2214 (2012) (awarding up to $1,000 in attorney’s fees to 
a successful plaintiff). 
 53 Matal I, 860 F.3d at 1353. 
 54 Id. 
 55 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184; NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal (Matal II), 869 F.3d 1327, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
 56 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184. The court received seven amicus briefs regarding how to inter-
pret the “all expenses of the proceeding” language, but none of the briefs supported the finding that 
“expenses” included attorney’s fees. Id. 
 57 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc., No. 18-801 (U.S. 
2018), 2018 WL 6788571. 
 58 Booking.com v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 895–96 (E.D. Va. 2017). Serial No. 85485097 
(“097 Application”) and Serial No. 79114998 (“998 Application”) were filed as Class 39 and Class 43 
services, respectively. Id. at 896–97. Serial No. 79122365 (“365 Application”) and Serial No. 
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BOOKING.COM was too generic and lacked the requisite distinctiveness 
trademarks require.59 During a consolidated hearing, the TTAB upheld the four 
refusals for trademark registration.60 On April 15, 2016, Booking filed a civil 
action under § 1071 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
challenging the USPTO’s denial of the applications.61 On a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the district court ordered the USPTO to register the BOOK-
ING.COM mark.62 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision, concluding that 
BOOKING.COM was a protectable trademark.63 
The USPTO subsequently filed a Motion for Expenses pursuant to 
§ 1071, asking the court to order Booking to pay its “reasonable expenses” of 
$76,873.61.64 The USPTO relied on the precedent set in 2015, in Shammas v. 
Focarino, where the Fourth Circuit interpreted the USPTO’s “reasonable ex-
                                                                                                                           
79122366 (“366 Application”) were filed only as Class 43 services. Id. at 897. A Class 39 service 
concerns in-person and online travel agency services. Id. at 896. A Class 43 service concerns making 
in-person and online hotel reservations. Id. at 897. A Madrid Protocol Filing is when an applicant files 
his mark and designates it to be protected in several countries. Madrid Protocol, USPTO, https://
www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/madrid-protocol [https://perma.cc/S5K3-ABHL]. 
 59 In re Booking.com B.V., 2016 TTAB LEXIS 63, at *53 (T.T.A.B. 2016); see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(d)–(f) (requiring a showing that the mark is distinctively associated with the applicant’s goods 
in commerce and not likely to be confusing to the public); see also USPTO, TMEP (5th ed. Sept. 
2007), § 1209.01 DISTINCTIVENESS/DESCRIPTIVENESS CONTINUUM (discussing the different stand-
ards of proof for distinctiveness). A mark that merely characterizes a service requires proof of distinc-
tiveness. Id. Additionally, a mark must be unique enough so that consumers understand its secondary 
purpose to associate the mark with the service it describes. Qadir Qeidary, Dilemma of Trade Dress, 
Informational Values and Enigmatic Distinctiveness; Semiotics Illuminating the Status of Distinctive-
ness, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 3–4 (2017). 
 60 In re Booking.com, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 63, at *53. Notably, the court relied on previous rejec-
tions of similar top-level domain marks such as HOTELS.COM and MATRESS.COM to point out 
that adding a “.com” domain to a generic word does not warrant trademark protection. Id. at *25–26. 
 61 Booking.com v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 898. 
 62 Id. at 896. The motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Id. The 
Court held that BOOKING.COM is a descriptive mark and Booking was able to demonstrate the 
mark’s meaning as a Class 43 services (hotel reservation services) but not a Class 39 service (travel 
agency services). Id. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s decision in 2017, Book-
ing.com I awarded attorney’s fees to the USPTO whereas the Federal Circuit did not, in 2018, in 
NantKwest v. Iancu. 898 F.3d at 1196; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *15. The 
Booking.com I court also held that the “.COM” trademark was an issue of first impression, thereby 
departing from Federal Circuit decisions indicating that top level domains are not entitled to trade-
mark protection. Booking.com v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 908–09; see, e.g., In re 1800Mattress.com 
IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (denying the trademark for MATRESS.COM); In re 
Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (denying the trademark for HOTELS.COM). 
 63 See Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *12. The court also rejected the per se 
rule proposed by the USPTO, that trademarks utilizing top level domains will always be generic and 
unprotectable. Id. 
 64 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3); Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *11. The USPTO 
defined “reasonable expenses” to include the salaries of the paralegals and attorneys who worked on the 
case. Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *11. 
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penses” to include attorney’s fees.65 Booking argued that the USPTO’s motion 
violated the American Rule.66 The district court sided with the USPTO, and 
following Shammas, held that the American Rule did not apply.67 Consequent-
ly, the district court interpreted “expenses” to include attorney’s fees.68 The 
court ordered Booking to pay the USPTO $76,873.61—despite the fact that it 
won the appeal of its trademark registration—pursuant to § 1071, which re-
quires the initiating party to pay the expenses of the proceeding, regardless of 
who prevails.69 Booking appealed and the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision, 
unwilling to depart from Fourth Circuit precedent in Shammas.70 
II. INTERPRETING § 145 AND § 1071: APPLICABILITY OF THE AMERICAN 
RULE AND EXAMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
In 2018, in NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit held that the American Rule applied to 35 U.S.C. § 145, 
whereas in 2019, in Booking.com v. USPTO (Booking.com II), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the opposite in its evalua-
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 1071.71 To resolve the issue, a court must first determine if 
the American Rule is implicated in the “all the expenses of the proceeding” 
statutes.72 If so, then Congress’s intent to include an award of attorney’s fees 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *11. In Shammas, 
the TTAB upheld the USPTO’s decision to deny Milo Shammas’ trademark application for the trade-
mark, PROBIOTIC, on the grounds that it was a generic term. 784 F.3d at 221. Shammas filed a de novo 
appeal pursuant to § 1071, where the district court granted summary judgment to the USPTO. Sham-
mas, 784 F.3d at 221. After the USPTO filed a Motion for Expenses, the district court ordered Milo 
Shammas to pay the USPTO $36,320.49 in expenses, including attorney’s fees. Id. The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed and found that the word “all” in the statute significantly modified the word “expenses,” meaning 
that the “expenses” were not subject to any limitations. Id. at 222. 
 66 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *11. 
 67 Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *12. In Shammas, 
the Fourth Circuit found that “regardless of whether he wins or loses” language in § 1071(b)(3) to be 
significant. Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221. Specifically, the court held that the American Rule was not impli-
cated because the statute did not impose the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees on the losing party. Id. 
Therefore, the court stated that the statute was not a form of fee-shifting because it only imposed an “un-
conditional compensatory charge.” Id. 
 68 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *15. 
 69 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3); Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *8, *15. 
 70 Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *29. 
 71 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012); Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO (Booking.com 
II), Nos. 17-2458, 17-2459, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019), at *29; NantKwest, 
Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1635 (U.S. Mar. 
4, 2019) (No. 18A-369); Booking.com B.V. v. Matal (Booking.com I), No. 1:16-cv-425, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178271 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2017), at *15. 
 72 See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (determining first 
whether the American Rule applies to a statute permitting compensation for professionals who aided 
trustees in bankruptcy proceedings); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 
(2010) (considering whether the American Rule applies to a statute that awards “reasonable attorney’s 
fee[s]”); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) (determining whether the 
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must be “specific and explicit” enough to overcome the American Rule pre-
sumption against awarding them.73 If the American Rule does not apply, the 
threshold for proving that “expenses” encompasses attorney’s fees is much 
lower.74 NantKwest and Booking.com II diverge in their analysis of the Ameri-
can Rule’s applicability.75 Accordingly, the cases also diverge in their statutory 
interpretation of “expenses” and their determination of congressional intent in 
§ 145 and § 1071.76 
 Section A of this Part explains the Federal Circuit’s application of the 
American Rule to 35 U.S.C. § 145 and the Fourth Circuit’s finding that the 
American Rule is not applicable to 15 U.S.C. § 1071.77 Section B of this Part 
discusses the Federal Circuit’s and Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “expenses” 
and legislative intent in 35 U.S.C. § 145 and 15 U.S.C. § 1071, respectively.78 
A. NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu and Booking.com v. USPTO’s Divergent 
Analysis of the American Rule’s Applicability 
In both NantKwest and Booking.com v. Matal (Booking.com I), the 
USPTO relied on the Fourth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Shammas v. Focarino 
to support its argument that the American Rule only applies when a statute 
shifts fees from the winning party to the losing party.79 Because § 145 and 
                                                                                                                           
American Rule applied to a statute that permitted recovery of “necessary costs”); Summit Valley 
Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 456 U.S. 717, 722 (1982) (discussing the American 
Rule’s application to a statute that does not explicitly provide for an award of attorney’s fees); 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (holding that the American 
Rule presumptively applies to statutes); NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184 (noting that the American Rule 
is the starting point when resolving fee-shifting statutes). 
 73 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260; see NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1186 (concluding that § 145 should not 
be able to bypass the heightened requirement of a specific congressional intent in order to depart from 
the American Rule). When evaluating whether Congress intended an award of attorney’s fees, courts 
typically look to the text of the statute and its legislative history. See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722–
23 (finding no support for an award of attorney’s fees in the language of the statute nor its legislative 
history); see also Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (looking at Congress’ choice of words in the bank-
ruptcy statute at issue compared to other provisions in the Bankruptcy code); Hardt, 560 U.S. at 423 
(contrasting two provisions in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to show that “Congress 
knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney's fees.”); Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 
817–18 (exploring whether there was congressional authorization for fee awards in the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
 74 Cf. NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1182 (noting that the American Rule imposes a “high bar” for al-
lowing an award of attorney’s fees). 
 75 See infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 93–109 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 93–109 and accompanying text. 
 79 Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *27–29; NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183; Book-
ing.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *13–14; see Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (concluding that the American Rule applies only when the party who makes a Motion for 
Expenses has prevailed). In addition to Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2015 decision in Shammas v. 
Focarino, the USPTO also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in 2013 in Sebelius v. Cloer. NantKwest, 
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§ 1071 impose expenses on the applicant, win or lose, the USPTO argued that 
the American Rule was not implicated.80 Ultimately, the courts diverged in 
their response to the USPTO’s argument and, as a result, came to opposite 
conclusions on what were otherwise remarkably similar questions in remarka-
bly similar procedural postures.81 
Holding that the USPTO was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees, the 
NantKwest court characterized the distinction between statutes that shift fees 
from the winner to the loser, and statutes that shift fees regardless of the out-
come, as trivial.82 In the court’s opinion, the fact that there was no mention of a 
“prevailing party” in the statute was an insufficient reason to refrain from ap-
plying the American Rule.83 Specifically, the NantKwest court noted that the 
Supreme Court has broadly applied the American Rule to fee-shifting statutes, 
regardless of how the fees are being shifted.84 Moreover, the court opined that 
the American Rule would be even more applicable when the winning party is 
faced with bearing the cost of the losing party’s attorney’s fees.85 Additionally, 
the court noted that it was unaware of any statute that requires a winning pri-
vate party to bear the cost of the government’s attorney’s fees.86 
                                                                                                                           
898 F.3d at 1186 (citing Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 373–74 (2013). In Cloer, the Supreme Court 
granted an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 569 U.S. at 
371–82. The Court, however, made no explicit mention of the American Rule when interpreting the stat-
ute. Id.; NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1186. The USPTO argued in NantKwest v. Iancu that because the 
Supreme Court did not consider the American Rule in Cloer, the American Rule does not apply when 
statutes do not impose a “success” requirement. NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1186 The Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2018, in its opinion in NantKwest, rejected this, and instead found that because 
the statute in Cloer used the phrase “attorney’s fees,” the Supreme Court implicitly applied the Amer-
ican Rule and found that it was displaced by congressional authorization. See id. (noting that the Su-
preme Court’s method of analysis in Cloer had no bearing on whether the American Rule applied to 
§ 145). 
 80 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *13–14. 
 81 See NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1185–86 (arguing that the decision in Shammas is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent that allows for an award of attorney’s fees to the losing party); Booking.com 
II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *27–29 (upholding Shammas). 
 82 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184. 
 83 Id. The court also provided examples of statutes where the Supreme Court applied the Ameri-
can Rule to statutes that made no mention of a “prevailing party.” Id. at 1185–86. Though the Sham-
mas court found the distinction to be substantial, Judge King, in his dissent in Shammas, did not ad-
dress this distinction. See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 227 (King, J., dissenting) (discussing how the historical 
importance and policy behind the American Rule requires its recognition in the case). 
 84 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1185; see, e.g., Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (applying the American 
Rule to a bankruptcy statute that permitted recovery of “reasonable compensation for . . . [an] attor-
ney”); Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 815 (applying the American Rule to an environmental statute that al-
lowed recovery of “necessary costs of response”). 
 85 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1184–85. 
 86 Id. at 1191–92. In Shammas, the court addressed the argument that, because the USPTO had 
salaried attorneys, it may have been unfair to make applicant’s pay for attorney’s fees. Shammas, 784 
F.3d at 223. The Shammas court ultimately held that when the USPTO’s attorneys are required to defend 
the Director, the USPTO’s resources are being diverted. Id. Though not contemplated by the courts, it has 
been argued that the USPTO should not be awarded attorney’s fees even in cases where it prevails. See 
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In finding in 2017 that the USPTO was entitled to recover attorney’s fees, 
the United States Distrcit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia highlighted 
in Booking.com I the distinction between statutes that shift fees from the win-
ning party to the losing party and ones that shift fees, regardless of who wins, 
to be substantial.87 Specifically, the court held that the American Rule did not 
apply because § 1071 made no mention of a prevailing party, nor did it require 
any success on the part of the USPTO.88 Accordingly, the Booking.com I court 
found that fee-shifting statutes that do not contain a “success” requirement do 
not implicate the American rule.89 In determining this, the court followed 
Shammas, where the Fourth Circuit concluded that § 1071 allows for an award 
of attorney’s fees.90 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in Booking.com II, empha-
sized that Shammas was the law in the Fourth Circuit.91 Therefore, despite the 
                                                                                                                           
Report 108A, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that the USPTO “is not a typical litigant that requires an award 
of attorney fees to be made whole”). This is because, as a government agency, the USPTO is not 
placed in the same situation as an average litigant when it comes time for trial. Id. Because the USPTO 
can set fees at appropriate levels to cover their costs, the agency has the ability to offset their litigation-
related costs, such as attorney’s fees, unlike the average litigant. Id.; see also NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 
1196 (providing that if that the USPTO spends one million dollars in attorney’s fees each year due to 
§ 145 proceedings, the agency would only have to charge patent applicants $1.60 more per application to 
recoup their loss). But see Shammas, 784 F.3d at 224 (distinguishing the USPTO from other governmen-
tal agencies that are ordinarily able to operate similar types of judicial review proceedings under a closed 
record). 
 87 See Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *14 (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in 
Shammas that the American Rule only applies when the statute requires that a party seeking fees ob-
tains some success). 
 88 See id. at *16–18 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s opinion in 2017 in NantKwest v. Matal 
(Matal II), 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which reversed the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia’s decision in 2016, in NantKwest v. Lee, 162 F. Supp. 3d 540 (E.D. Va. 
2016), due to questions about whether an application of the American Rule to § 145 was warranted 
without a mention of a “prevailing party” in the statute). The district court in 2017, in Booking.com 
B.V. v. Matal (Booking.com I), also noted that the Federal Circuit would only provide persuasive au-
thority on the whether to award attorney’s fees under § 1071. Id. at *18 n.5. 
 89 Id. at *13–14. 
 90 Id. at *14. The Booking.com I court rejected Booking.com’s argument that the reasoning in 
Shammas was overruled by the Supreme Court in 2015, in Baker Botts v. ASARCO, where a provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize a bankruptcy court to award attorney’s fees. See id. at *15 
(finding the Fourth Circuit in Shammas as more persuasive than the Supreme Court in Baker Botts 
because Shammas directly addressed § 1071, whereas the Baker Botts case only interpreted the Bank-
ruptcy Code). In Shammas, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 1983, in 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club. Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 
684 (1983)). In Ruckelshaus, the Court held that virtually all fee-shifting statutes that implicate the 
American Rule deal with imposing attorney’s fees specifically on the losing party. 463 U.S. at 682–
85. The Shammas court interpreted Ruckelshaus narrowly by claiming that any statute that does not 
shift fees based on one party’s success does not implicate the American Rule. Shammas, 784 F.3d at 
223. In interpreting Ruckelshaus, the NantKwest court, however, noted that the absence of a “success” 
requirement does not necessarily mean that the American Rule cannot be applied. NantKwest, 898 
F.3d at 1185. 
 91 Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *29. The Booking.com II court recognized that 
the American Rule has been applied in NantKwest and Baker Botts to statutes that do not mention a 
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fact that Booking was the prevailing party in the § 1071 proceeding, the 
USPTO was entitled to recover attorney’s fees.92 
B. NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu and Booking.com v. USPTO’s Divergent 
Interpretations of “Expense” and Congressional Intent 
When interpreting statutes, courts give words their “ordinary meaning” at 
the time the statute was enacted.93 Because the NantKwest court applied the 
American Rule, the court required the ordinary meaning of “expenses” to dis-
play a “specific and explicit” congressional intent to authorize an award of at-
torney’s fees.94 The Booking.com I court also looked to the ordinary meaning 
of “expenses” and congressional intent, but did not apply the heightened “spe-
cific and explicit” standard imposed by the American Rule.95 
The Booking.com I court held that “all of the expenses of the proceeding” 
encompassed an award of attorney’s fees.96 To support this, the court noted that 
the Supreme Court has found the word “expenses” to be much broader than 
“costs.”97 Citing dictionary definitions of “expense” to support its reasoning, 
the court additionally found the use of the “all” modifier in front of the word 
“expenses” to be compelling.98 Further, the Booking.com I court considered the 
                                                                                                                           
prevailing party. Id. Notably, the Booking.com II court conceded that this might indicate that the 
American Rule does apply to § 1071. Id. Nonetheless, the Booking.com II court noted that Shammas 
was binding and upheld the decision in Booking.com I to award the USPTO attorney’s fees. Id. 
 92 Id.; Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *14, *32. 
 93 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (providing that a cardinal canon of statutory 
interpretation is to give words their ordinary meaning when they are not defined). In 1979, in Perrin v. 
United States, the Court was faced with an interpretation of “bribery” in the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1952, and looked to the ordinary meaning of the word when Congress enacted the statute. Id. 
 94 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1187 (defining “expenses” in 1839 when Congress enacted the prede-
cessor to § 145 as “[a] laying out or expending; the disbursing of money, or the employment and con-
sumption, as of time or labor”) (quoting Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1st ed. 1828)). 
 95 See Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *16–18 (discussing the word “expenses” 
without applying the “specific and explicit” congressional intent standard to defeat the American rule 
presumption against awarding attorney’s fees). 
 96 See id. at *16–18 (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “expenses” to include 
“attorney’s fees” in Shammas). 
 97 Id. at *16; see Kouichi Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 573 (2012) (conclud-
ing that “costs” only represent a subset of “expenses”). In Shammas, the Fourth Circuit looked at the 
use of the words “costs” and “expenses” in the sentence following the “all expenses of the proceed-
ing” language in § 1071(b)(3). Shammas, 784 F.3d at 224. There, the court applied the canon of statutory 
construction that presumes that no word in a statute is superfluous to conclude that Congress intended 
“expenses” and “costs” to be different. Id. 
 98 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *12. The court cited Wright & Miller on 
Federal Practice and Procedure, which defined “expenses” as “includ[ing] all the expenditures actual-
ly made by a litigant in connection with the action,” including “attorney’s fees.” Id. (citing CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2666 (3d ed. 1998)). The court also 
cited Black’s Law Dictionary defining “expenses” as “expenditure[s] of money, time, labor, or re-
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legislative history of § 1071, noting that § 1071 was derived from a provision 
in the Patent Act of 1836, which distinguished between attorney’s fees and ex-
penses.99 The Booking.com I court reasoned that § 1071’s origins made it clear 
that an award of attorney’s fees were subsumed in the expenses.100 
Applying the American Rule, however, the NantKwest court found that 
“expenses” was not “specific and explicit” enough to warrant an award of at-
torney’s fees.101 Though the court agreed that “expenses” is broader than 
“costs,” it found the distinction to be irrelevant to whether expenses specifical-
ly included attorney’s fees.102 Moreover, the NantKwest court found that the 
“all” modifier did not clarify whether attorney’s fees was included in expens-
es.103 Additionally, the court criticized the use of legislative history to discern 
congressional intent.104 This is because, the NantKwest court explained, the 
“specific and explicit” requirement to displace the American Rule demands a 
textual analysis of the statute at hand.105 Therefore, the court evaluated the 
statute’s language.106 This included examining other statutes that distinguished 
between expenses and attorney’s fees.107 This method of statutory interpreta-
                                                                                                                           
sources to accomplish a result.” Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *12 (citing Expens-
es, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 99 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *14 (citing the Patent Act of 1836, which 
established “a fund for the payment of the salaries of the officers and clerks herein provided for, and all 
other expenses of the Patent Office”). This argument was highly relied upon by Chief Judge Prost in her 
dissent in NantKwest. See 898 F.3d at 1196–99 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Patent Act of 
1836 characterized attorney’s fees as expenses). 
 100 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *14. 
 101 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1194–95. 
 102 Id. at 1188 (finding Congress’s use of “expenses,” and “attorney’s fees” in other statutes to be 
more telling on the issue than dictionary definitions). 
 103 Id. at 1194 (providing that “the word ‘all’ sheds no light on the breadth of ‘expenses’” but 
rather, “only to clarify that, whatever the ‘expenses’ are, all of them must be paid by the applicant”). 
 104 Id. In addressing the legislative history, the NantKwest court noted that the provision in the 
Patent Act of 1836 that indicated that attorney’s fees were included in “expenses” was taken out of 
context. Id. at 1195. That provision, the court noted, was a provision that focused solely on accounting 
the money the USPTO receives, which is unlike § 145 that governs the de novo district court proceed-
ings. Id. Additionally, the court expressed hesitation that “the salaries of the officers and clerks herein 
provided for,” included the USPTO’s attorney’s fees. Id. 
 105 Id. at 1194. The NantKwest court was skeptical of the use of legislative history in discerning 
“specific and explicit” congressional intent, which, in the court’s opinion, was a text-based test. Id. 
 106 Id. at 1188. This method of statutory interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991) (looking at “the record of statutory 
usage” to discern whether Congress regarded “attorney’s fees” and “expert fees” as distinct in fee-
shifting statutes). 
 107 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1188; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (2012) (allowing recovery of “any 
costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses incurred”); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(B)(vii) (2012) (“court . . . may 
allow to any such party reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees”); 26 U.S.C. § 6673(a)(2)(A) (2012) 
(allowing recovery of “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees”); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012) 
(awarding “reasonable expenses . . . plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”); 38 U.S.C. 
§ 4323(h)(2) (2012) (awarding “reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation 
expenses”). Though the Booking.com I court looked at other statutes enacted by Congress, the court 
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tion also enabled the court to look at other provisions in the Patent Act that 
used the phrase, “attorney’s fees.”108 In doing so, the NantKwest court found 
that Congress enacted many statutes and explicit provisions that differentiate 
between expenses and attorney’s fees, which supported its finding that the 
USPTO was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.109 
III. THE USPTO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOUP ATTORNEY’S FEES 
As a result of not applying the American Rule and interpreting expenses 
in 15 U.S.C. § 1071 broadly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in 2019, in Booking.com v. USPTO (Booking.com II), has deterred ap-
plicants from filing de novo appeals.110 This is because the process will be-
come too costly if applicants are always required to bear the cost of the 
USPTO’s attorney’s fees.111 Additionally, because Congress has not specifical-
ly called for an award of attorney’s fees in 15 U.S.C. § 1071 nor 35 U.S.C. 
§ 145, they should be disallowed under both statutes to resolve the conflict.112 
Thus, the Supreme Court should err on the side of the American Rule and up-
hold Federal Circuit’s decision to not award attorney’s fees.113 
The American Rule, which works to ensure equal access to the legal sys-
tem, supports the contention that applicants should not be penalized with the 
                                                                                                                           
distinguished only between “expenses” and “costs,” not “expenses” and “attorneys’ fees.” See 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *15 (finding “expenses” to be broader than “costs”). 
 108 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1190; see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (providing that “[t]he court in excep-
tional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); 35 U.S.C. § 297(b)(1) (per-
mitting recovery of “reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees”). 
 109 Id. at 1188, 1190. 
 110 See Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO (Booking.com II), Nos. 17-2458, 17-2459, 2019 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3456 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019), at *29 (upholding the decision of the Booking.com I court); Book-
ing.com B.V. v. Matal (Booking.com I), No. 1:16-cv-425, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 26, 2017), at *14 (refusing to apply the American Rule and interpreting “expenses” to include 
“attorney’s fees”); Report 108A, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing how applicants would be less willing to 
file district court appeals if they were forced to pay the USPTO’s attorney’s fees). 
 111 See Report 108A, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing how the fee-shifting of attorney’s salaries 
would deter applicants who have already invested a significant amount of money by the time they 
have to file a de novo action). 
 112 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012). Though these statutes refer to two different 
types of intellectual property, trademarks and patents, courts should aim to provide a consistent inter-
pretation because they both require “all the expenses of the proceeding” to be paid by the applicant 
and regulate de novo appeals to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
See NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 
1635 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2019) (No. 18A-369) (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1071); 
Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *16 (discussing the district court’s interpretation of 
§ 145). 
 113 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1196 (disallowing an award of attorney’s fees under § 145 because the 
text of the statute was not “specific and explicit” enough to overcome the American Rule presump-
tion); see supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
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USPTO’s attorney’s fees absent specific congressional authority.114 If the 
USPTO is awarded attorney’s fees, applicants seeking to challenge the 
USPTO’s decisions would face an overwhelming financial hurdle.115 Given the 
high cost of attorney’s fees,116 the financial burden would deprive applicants of 
the strategic opportunity to introduce new evidence by filing a de novo civil 
action.117 Though applicants can pursue relief at the Federal Circuit to avoid 
additional costs, such appeals are limited to the record of the PTAB or TTAB 
proceeding and thus, are not a viable alternative when the introduction of new 
evidence is essential to an applicant’s case.118 Despite the fact that the statutes 
do not mention of a prevailing party, the American Rule should be applied to 
both § 145 and § 1071.119 
The Booking.com II court recognized that legislative history may have in-
dicated Congress’ intent for expenses to include the salaries of USPTO em-
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Summit Valley Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 456 U.S. 717, 726 (1982) 
(refusing to award attorney’s fees because such an award could not be clearly construed from the text 
of the statute); Report 108A, supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that awarding the USPTO attorney’s fees 
would undermine the purpose of the American Rule). 
 115 Report 108A, supra note 9, at 1. 
 116 See, e.g., NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183 (noting that the USPTO sought to recover $78,592.50 
in attorney’s fees); Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *11 (awarding the USPTO 
$76,873.61 in attorney’s fees). By the time the applicant has reached this stage, he has likely spent around 
$25,000 on the application and prosecution process. Dennis Crouch, Challenging USPTO Decisions in 
the Courts, PATENTLYO.COM (Apr. 9, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/challenging-uspto-
decisions-in-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/Z27C-PKKC]; see also Bernstein, supra note 42, at 1465 
(discussing the high cost of patent litigation). 
 117 Report 108A, supra note 9, at 1; see Bill Donahue, The Next 4 Big Copyright and Trademark 
Rulings Are . . ., LAW360 (Jun. 26, 2018, 7:33PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1055408 
[https://perma.cc/Q57K-JYSF] (noting that the USPTO is taking it upon themselves to create rules by 
demanding an outrageous amount of money from trademark and patent applicants who appeal to the 
district court). See generally Marvin Petry & Robert E. Scully Jr., Advantages of Challenging USPTO 
Decisions in the EDVA, STITES & HARBISON PLLC (May 6, 2013), https://www.stites.com/resources/
articles/advantages-of-challenging-uspto-decisions-in-the-edva [https://perma.cc/48ZF-89H2] (dis-
cussing several advantages of an appeal to the Eastern District of Virginia, such as a speedy decision 
due to the court’s “rocket docket”) The USPTO is effectively discouraging applicants to appeal to the 
district court even when it is a better option for them strategically because most applicants cannot 
afford to bear the exorbitant costs, even if the USPTO was wrong in denying their patent or trademark 
application. Donahue, supra. 
 118 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); 35 U.S.C. §§ 141–143; Report 108A, supra note 9, at 4. Contra Book-
ing.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *23 (arguing that an applicant can avoid incurring addi-
tional expenses by filing in the Federal Circuit). 
 119 See NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1183 (applying the American Rule to § 145); Booking.com I, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *18 n.5 (noting that the Federal Circuit provides persuasive authority on 
the issue because § 145 is the patent analogue to § 1071); Booking.com II, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3456, at *29 (noting that NantKwest and Baker Botts v. ASARCO may indicate that the American Rule 
can be applied to statutes, such as § 1071 that do not refer to a prevailing party); see, e.g., Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2165 (2015) (applying the American Rule to a statute that 
made no mention of a prevailing party); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) 
(concluding that the American Rule applied to a statute that allowed recovery of “necessary costs”). 
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ployees.120 The record of statutory usage, however, is more probative than the 
legislative history in this case.121 This is because, in applying the American 
Rule, the question is whether there is “specific and explicit” congressional in-
tent for expenses to include attorney’s fees.122 Congress has enacted many 
statutes that differentiate between expenses and attorney’s fees and has also 
explicitly defined expenses to include attorney’s fees.123 The NantKwest court 
posited that Congress would not specify whether expenses encompassed attor-
ney’s fees in some statutes if Congress had the “specific and explicit” intent for 
expenses to include attorney’s fees in all statutes.124 
Additionally, by looking at Congress’s award of attorney’s fees in other 
sections of the Patent Act, it is unlikely that Congress intended to award attor-
ney’s fees in § 145.125 Applying a similar mode of analysis to the Lanham Act 
would likely lead a court to the same conclusion about § 1071.126 Because 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Booking.com I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178271, at *12. 
 121 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing how the Patent Act of 1836 showed 
Congress’ intent for “attorney’s fees” to be included in “expenses”); NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1188 
(inquiring into the record of statutory usage); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S 83, 
88 (1991) (looking at the record of statutory usage to discern between “attorney’s fees” and “expert 
fees.”). But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa S. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 965 (2013) (finding 
that both Democratic and Republican legislative drafters viewed legislative history as the most im-
portant tool of interpretation). See generally Larry M. Eig, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory 
Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82L9-7U8U] (summarizing different methods of statutory interpretation). 
 122 See NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1194 (expressing that a textual inquiry is required in order to satis-
fy the explicitness required to displace the American Rule). 
 123 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1188; see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 396 (awarding “reimbursement from . . . 
the House of Representatives of his reasonable expenses of the contested election case, including 
reasonable attorneys fees”);10 U.S.C. § 2409(c)(1)(C) (defining “all costs and expenses” to include 
“attorneys’ fees and expert witnesses’ fees”); 12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(2)(B) (defining “interest and ex-
penses” to include “costs and reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
(defining “just costs and any actual expenses” to include “attorney fees”); 29 U.S.C. § 1370(e)(1) 
(“[T]he court . . . may award all or a portion of the costs and expenses incurred . . . including reasona-
ble attorney’s fees . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(9)(awarding “reasonable expenses incurred . . . 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee”). 
 124 See NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1189 (inferring that Congress would not logically add redundan-
cies to statutes); see also Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (noting that courts should 
assume that every word in a statute has meaning, and avoid construing statutes in a way that “implies 
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”). Ironically, this is the 
same canon of statutory interpretation that the Fourth Circuit used in 2015 in its opinion in Shammas 
v. Focarino to prove that Congress meant to distinguish between “expenses” and “costs.” 784 F.3d 
219, 223 (4th Cir. 2015); see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 125 NantKwest, 898 F.3d at 1190; see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (awarding prevailing litigants “rea-
sonable attorney fees”); see also Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (noting that it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts purposefully when particular language is included in one sec-
tion of a statute but omitted in others). 
 126 See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 228 (King, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress has explicitly author-
ized attorney’s fees in five other provisions of the Lanham Act); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) 
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Congress did not specifically provide for an award of attorney’s fees to over-
come the American Rule presumption, the USPTO should not be allowed to 
recoup attorney’s fees.127 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over whether to award the USPTO attorney’s fees under 35 
U.S.C. § 145 and 15 U.S.C. § 1071 is unique in that only the Federal Circuit 
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have the authority to rule on this issue. 
Although the Federal Circuit applied the American Rule presumption against 
awarding attorney’s fees in NantKwest v. Iancu, the Fourth Circuit in Shammas 
v. Focarino did not. Shammas constrained the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia in concluding the same in Booking.com I and 
the Fourth Circuit in Booking.com II. An application of American Rule to 
§ 1071 and § 145, however, would serve to preserve access to the district court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia for individuals, small businesses, and inven-
tors. Ultimately, by not applying the American rule and interpreting “expens-
es” broadly, the Fourth Circuit has deterred applicants from filing de novo ap-
peals, because the process will become too expensive if applicants are always 
burdened with the government’s attorney’s fees. Because Congress has not 
“specifically and explicitly” provided for an award of attorney’s fees, the Su-
preme Court should err on the side of the American Rule and uphold the Fed-
eral Circuit’s decision. 
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(awarding “reasonable attorney’s fee”); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (awarding “reasonable attorney fees” to 
prevailing parties). 
 127 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4) (allowing recovery for “all the expenses of the proceeding”); 35 
U.S.C. § 145 (providing that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant”); 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975) (requiring “specific and 
explicit” language to displace the American Rule). 
